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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS-FRUITS OF THE
SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S AUTOMOBILE SUPPRESSED DUE To UNCONSTITUTIONAL
SEARCH AND SEIZURE.-In the recent case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443 (1971), the United States Supreme Court was confronted solely with
the issue of admissibility of certain evidence taken during a search of defendant's
premises. The Court held that an automobile, which was parked in the defen-
dant's driveway, was unconstitutionally searched. The defendant's conviction
was reversed and remanded.
On January 21, 1964, the body of a fourteen-year-old girl was found by
the police. She had been brutally beaten and shot in the head. On January 28,
1964, officers of the Manchester Police Department went to Edward Coolidge's
home to question him about the murder. During this visit, Coolidge surrendered
three rifles and agreed to take a lie detector test. While Coolidge was taking this
test, two police officers returned to his house and questioned Mrs. Coolidge, the
defendant's wife. During this visit Mrs. Coolidge surrendered a fourth rifle and
also produced some of her husband's clothing. These items were later intro-
duced in evidence at the defendant's trial.
On February 19, Coolidge was arrested at his home pursuant to an arrest
warrant. He was charged with murder. On the same day, an application for a
warrant to search the defendant's car was filed with the justice of the peace.
The justice of the peace was also the Attorney General of New Hampshire who
had directed the murder investigation. He later acted as chief prosecuting at-
torney at the trial. The warrant was issued and Coolidge's 1951 Pontiac was
taken from the driveway of the defendant's home and searched at the police
station. Vacuum sweepings taken from the defendant's car were used as evidence
at trial. The sweepings contained hair of the murdered girl and particles of her
clothing. The defendant was convicted on two counts of murder. The New
Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.
Coolidge first argued that when his wife produced the fourth rifle and the
clothing she was acting as an agent for the state. Therefore, the defense con-
tended that a search and seizure had taken place without a warrant in violation
of the fourth amendment. The basis of this contention was that the police
coerced Mrs. Coolidge into surrendering incriminating evidence which could
be used against her husband. If actually coerced, Mrs. Coolidge became an agent
of the state. Since the police could not enter and search the house without a
warrant, they could not employ an agent to make the search for them. There-
fore, according to Coolidge, the search was unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court,' found no such violation of
the fourth amendment. The testimony at trial indicated that Mrs. Coolidge was
cooperating with the police in an effort to clear her husband. No evidence was
1 Only Mr. Justice Douglas, Mr. Justice Brennan, and Mr. Justice Marshall agreed
entirely with the majority opinion.
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presented that showed the police were in any way coercive. No warrant was
required because the police had no intention of searching the house. Their pur-
pose in going to the house was to question Mrs. Coolidge in order to cor-
roborate her husband's story. The rifle and the clothing were given to the police
voluntarily, and thus no search and seizure occurred. Therefore, the fourth rifle
and the clothing were admissible.
Coolidge next argued that the warrant to seize and search his automobile
was invalid because the warrant was not issued by a neutral and detached
magistrate. Quoting at length from Johnson v. United States,2 the majority of
the Court agreed with Coolidge's argument. The determination of sufficient
probable cause was made by the chief law enforcement agent of the state, the
Attorney General, who was acting as a magistrate. The Attorney General was
also the prosecuting attorney at the trial. Relying on the Johnson opinion, Mr.
Justice Stewart stated that prosecutors and policemen cannot maintain the
requisite detachment to determine probable cause regarding their own investi-
gations. The detached and neutral attitude which a magistrate must possess com-
petes with the main function of law enforcement officers, that being arresting
and convicting criminals. Therefore, the warrant issued in Coolidge was invalid.
Accepting the proposition that the warrant was invalid, the state argued
in the alternative, that this particular search fell into three well-known excep-
tions to the rule requiring search warrants.
The state first argued that the search and seizure was valid because it was
incident to a valid arrest. However, interpreting the Court's opinion in United
States v. Rabinowitz,3 Mr. Justice Stewart found that a search incident to a
valid arrest could only be made within the specific area of control or possession
of the person being arrested. A lawful arrest of a person outside his house does
not justify a warrantless search inside his house. Likewise, a valid arrest of
Coolidge, inside his house, did not justify a search and seizure outside his
house. Therefore, the seizure of the car could not be upheld as a search incident
to a valid arrest.
Secondly, the state argued that under Carroll v. United States,4 the police
may make a warrantless search of an automobile whenever they have probable
cause to do so. In disposing of this argument, Mr. Justice Stewart examined the
rationale behind the Carroll decision. When an automobile is stopped along a
highway, to require a search warrant would be impractical if probable cause
for a search of the car exists. A car is a mobile object and could easily be
moved while the police are waiting for a warrant. However, in Coolidge, the
police knew for several days that the car might have been involved in the crime.
Coolidge knew he was a suspect in the murder investigation and even cooperated
2 333 U.S. 10 (1947).
8 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
4 267 U.S. 132 (1924).
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with the police. He showed no indication that he planned to flee or to destroy
any evidence. Since the police had no justifiable belief that the car was going to
be moved or that evidence was going to be destroyed, the Carroll decision could
not be applied and the search of the car without a valid warrant violated the
fourth amendment.
Thirdly, the state contended that since the car was an instrumentality of the
crime which was in plain view, the police could seize it without a warrant. The
basis of the "plain view" doctrine is that when police are in a place where they
have a right to be, they may seize evidence of a crime without a warrant. How-
ever, plain view alone is never enough to justify a seizure. One of the limitations
of the plain view doctrine is that the discovery of evidence must be inadvertent.
If the police know of the existence of the evidence it must be particularly de-
scribed in a warrant. In Coolidge, the police knew for some time that the car
was probably related to the crime. If the search were held valid under the "plain
view" doctrine in this instance, the requirement of obtaining a warrant would,
in effect, be meaningless.
Since the warrant was in fact invalid and since the court did not feel that
any of the recognized exceptions fit the circumstances, the exclusionary rule of
evidence was applied and the conviction was reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Stewart's opinion appears to establish the rule that when ample
time exists to secure a search warrant, such a warrant will be required in all
cases. The new test applied by the Court emphasizes the amount of time needed
to get a search warrant, rather than the reasonableness of the particular search.
In effect, if time to get a warrant exists, the enforcement agency must use that
time to get a warrant regardless of the existence of any exigent circumstances.
Mr. Justice Harlan filed a reluctant concurring opinion. He expressed seri-
ous concern over the confusing state of the law regarding search and seizure as
evidenced by the several divergent opinions filed in Coolidge. He felt that the
law of search and seizure needed a drastic overhaul which could best be begun
by overruling Mapp v. Ohio5 and Ker v. Cali/ornia.6 These cases applied the
fourth amendment to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment and forced compliance with the federal decisions regarding search
and seizure.
Justice Harlan saw two basic problems with the Mapp and Ker decisions.
First, the states have been forced to adopt the federal standard which deprived
the country of the opportunity to examine different state procedures. Justice
Harlan felt that the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule has never been
established and that a great deal has been lost through forcing compliance with
a rule which may have no legitimacy. Had the states been given the freedom to
experiment, an alternative, superior to the exclusionary rule, might have de-
veloped. Second, Justice Harlan observed that because Mapp and Ker were
5 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
6 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
DISCUSSION OF RECENT'DECISIONS
made applicable to the states, the federal law has been relaxed to adjust to the
diverse needs of the states. Justice Harlan probably would have sustained the
conviction, but he was not ready to stray from precedent.
Mr. Justice Black wrote a strong opinion which concurred in part and
dissented in part. He agreed with Mr. Justice Stewart that the clothing and the
fourth rifle were properly admitted into evidence. However, he could not agree
that the car was improperly seized. He would have affirmed the conviction.
Justice Black traced the historical development of the exclusionary rule.
He stated his belief that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination has,
by its very words, an exclusionary rule. However, he could find no such pro-
vision in the fourth amendment. According to Justice Black, the fourth amend-
ment only states how the police may obtain a warrant, not what happens if they
fail to comply with these requirements. Justice Black attributed the early devel-
opment of the fourth amendment exclusionary rule to Boyd v. United States.7
Boyd dealt mainly with fifth amendment principles but also applied the same
type of exclusionary rule to the fourth amendment. Since Boyd, Justice Black
argued, the court has "expanded the Amendment beyond recognition. And each
new step is justified as merely a logical extension of the step before." Accord-
ing to Justice Black's strict-constructionist analysis, if the framers of our Consti-
tution had desired an exclusionary rule of evidence under the fourth amendment,
they would have provided for it as they did in the fifth amendment.
In Part II of his opinion, Mr. Justice Black expressed the opinion that the
warrant to search and seize the car was valid. Again applying his strict-construc-
tionist analysis, Black felt that the requirements of the fourth amendment were
met in Coolidge. Probable cause was present and the items searched were de-
scribed with particularity. Justice Black argued that the Constitution does not
forbid the Attorney General from being a magistrate, nor does it require that
the magistrate be detached. Accordingly, the court is requiring procedures not
required by the Constitution. Nowhere in the Constitution is the "little trial"
theory9 dealing with the "detached magistrate" to be found.
In Part III of Justice Black's opinion, he expressed his complete agree-
ment with the arguments posed by the attorneys for the State of New Hamp-
shire: even if the warrant were invalid, the search was still valid because it fell
into all three of the well established exceptions to the rule requiring search
warrants. The search was incident to a valid arrest; the item was in plain
view; and an automobile could be searched whenever probable cause existed.
Mr. Justice Blackmun joined in Parts II and III of Justice Black's opinion
7 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
8 39 U.S.L.W. 4795, 4812 (U.S. Jun. 21, 1971).
9 The "little trial" theory deals with the process of obtaining a search warrant. Some
people are of the opinion that the procedure involved in obtaining a warrant is similar
to a little trial before a warrant is issued. The adherents of this theory would require an
impartial judge to try the issues involved before a warrant is issued.
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and also in the portion of Part I which stated that the Constitution provides
no exclusionary rule for the fourth amendment.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger joined in Parts II and III and most of Part I
of Justice Black's opinion. However, he was not prepared to agree that the
fifth amendment requires the exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the
fourth amendment.
Mr. Justice White, joined by the Chief Justice, also dissented. He felt that
the automobile was seized properly under the plain view doctrine as discussed
in Cooper v. California."° Mr. Justice White believed that the requirement of
inadvertency, as set forth in the majority opinion, was too confusing to be of
any value. If the automobile had been found in the street or in a public parking
lot, it could be seized without a warrant, even if the police knew of its ex-
istence in advance. But, since the car was on the defendant's property, he felt
that rule should not have been applied. According to Justice White, the fourth
amendment protects property rights. Once the property right has been invaded
under the provisions of the fourth amendment or through an exception, no
reason exists any longer to draw close distinctions as to what may or may not
be seized since a search has been authorized. Here, the police were validly on
the defendant's property; they observed a car in plain view while on the prem-
ises; and they should have been allowed to seize it.
The court's decision in Coolidge is much more than the addition of the
inadvertancy requirement to the plain view doctrine. The true significance is
the obvious dissatisfaction expressed by several members of the court with the
exclusionary rule and its application.
The future of the exclusionary rule is uncertain. Justices Black and Harlan
are no longer on the court. Recently appointed Justices Powell and Rehnquist
are judicial conservatives and if they join with the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Blackmun, the continued existence of the exclusionary rule is in doubt. Unlike
the "Warren Court" which led the country in terms of liberal criminal ideology,
the "Burger Court" has returned to a conservative approach not unlike the pre-
New Deal era. An obvious blacklash seems to be striving to redefine and possibly
undermine the more liberal "Warren Court" decisions.
Certain opinions expressed in Coolidge should be noted with this trend in
mind. First, the Chief Justice and Justice Black would reverse Mapp and Ker
if the decisions were left entirely to them. This view would, in effect, return to
the states the power to determine for themselves what evidence shall be admissi-
ble at trial. Second, although Justice Harlan, who supported the abandonment
of the exclusionary rule as applied to the states, is no longer on the Court, his
successor may indeed agree with the former Justice's opinion. Third, in his
dissenting opinion, Justice White indicated that he would have extended the
10 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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physical area of lawful searches and seizures. In effect, this view would severely
limit any exclusionary rule which might survive.
If the exclusionary rule is no longer applicable, what exactly will be lost
in terms of the right to privacy or security? At this time, this question cannot
be answered, for as Justice Black pointed out in his opinion, no other solution
has been attempted. Although, as Justice Black further stated, the fourth amend-
ment does not by its very words require that evidence obtained in violation of
its provisions be excluded from subsequent proceedings, no other method of
enforcement seems possible.
The purpose of the fourth amendment was to insure the privacy and se-
curity of the citizens of this country. Unreasonable searches and seizures were
therefore forbidden. What better way exists to insure such privacy and security
than by enforcing the rule that any evidence seized in violation of the pro-
visions of the fourth amendment cannot be used in subsequent criminal proceed.
ings? A tort action would do very little for one who's privacy has already been
invaded. Admittedly, the fourth amendment does not by its very terms require
such exclusion. However, the framers of our Constitution knew what they in-
tended, when they drafted the fourth amendment, and would not have included
this protection unless they meant for its provisions to be implemented. The
fourth amendment, absent some type of enforcement procedure, is a meaningless
guarantee.
The law in the area of search and seizure is confusing. However, such
confusion is no reason to abandon a rule, which to this day has been the only
workable solution to the problem. The sensible approach would seem to be to
attempt some scholarly clarification of the existing doctrine rather than to
abandon the present remedy.
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